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THE FISHERY
MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT
DISTRIBUTION

CONSERVATION AND
ACT OF 1976:
OBJECTIVES AND THE
OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

Francis T. Christy, Jr.*
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)'
has fundamentally changed the opportunities and responsibilities for
domestic management of fisheries. It provides, for the first time, sufficient authority to permit the adoption of effective management measures. It is not clear, however, that the Act will be implemented in such
a way as to achieve effective management. The Act's most serious
deficiency lies in the lack of a satisfactory statement of management
objectives and adequate guidelines for decisionmaking. It is not unreasonable to expect that the resulting inconsistency and confusion
will lead to litigation in the courts and an early reappraisal of the Act
by Congress.
The purpose of this article is to raise some questions concerning the
appropriate objectives for fishery management. Management objectives are evaluated by examining the implications of different policies
regarding the distribution of benefits and costs among the many and
varied interests involved. Part I of the article begins with a discussion
of the failure of the Act and its legislative history to provide satisfactory objectives. Part II identifies some of the interests related to the
use of fishery resources, and Part III examines the likely effects on
these interests of policy choices in three issue areas-the adoption of
entry limits (including the technique of user taxes or fees), the investment of public funds, and the allocation of yields. In the process, an
attempt to illustrate the importance of clearly defining management
objectives is made.
I.

MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
Domestic management objectives are found in those sections of the

*

Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.

1. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A.
Supp. 1977)) [hereinafter cited as FCMA].

§§

1801-1882.(West
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Act dealing with purposes and policies,2 definitions, 3 and national standards. 4 The Act defines a major policy objective to be the realization
of an "optimum yield" from each fishery. 5 As used, "optimum" means
the following:
[T] he amount of fish(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation,
with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, 6as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.
The nebulous nature of this standard, however, renders it ineffective
in providing a basis for decisionmaking. "Optimum yield" becomes
merely a "best" yield, to be defined on an ad hoc basis by decisionmakers. Thus, in view of the current dominance of industry represent7
atives on the Regional Fishery Management Councils, "optimum"
is likely to be interpreted as that yield best for industry, while other
valid interests are deemphasized or even ignored.
Various other statements of the Act can be distilled into a handful
of simpler, although not necessarily more helpful, objectives. One goal
is that of promoting commercial and recreational fishing. 8 However,
no clues are given as to how much promotion is desirable, the means
that might be used to promote fishing, the kinds of benefits that might
accrue to society, or the amount of costs that might be incurred and
who is to bear them. Nor is it clear where the responsibility should lie
for the implementation of this objective. Is it a function of the Regional Councils and, if so, what means are available to them for fulfilling the function? Or is it the responsibility of the Secretary of
Commerce? These and other problems associated with this objective
are discussed more fully below in Part III-B. In addition,
2. Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) § 2. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801
(West Supp. 1977).
3. Id. § 3. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802.
4. Id.§ 301, 16U.S.C.A.§ 1851.
5. Id. § 301(1). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(1).
6. Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18). The concept of optimum yield goes a
step beyond its forerunner, maximum sustainable yield, which is a purely physical
concept with no relationship to social interests.
7. See Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications
of the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REv. 641 (1977).
8. FCMA § 2(b)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
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Part II illustrates the internal conflict in this objective-that is, that
the promotion of commercial fishing may sometimes be in conflict
with the promotion of recreational fishing.
A second objective-that of minimizing the costs of conservation
and management measures-is both laudable and clear.9 In the past,
such costs have seldom been given satisfactory consideration. Except
possibly for the Office of Management and Budget, no agency has included such costs in calculations of the overall contributions of fisheries to the national economy. If a management measure is proposed
that would carry high costs of implementation or enforcement, it may
be possible to reject that measure and require the adoption of a less
costly one.' 0
Third, there is an explicit objective that management measures
should be designed to assure "a multiplicity of options available with
respect to future uses of these [fishery] resources."" In addition, it is
stated that such measures shall be carried out "in such manner that no
particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of [fishing] privileges.' 2 While desirable, these are relatively unimportant goals at the present time.
Finally, there is an explicit goal of achieving efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources.13 It seems clear from the words of the Act
4
and from the discussion of this provision in the interim regulations'
that the objective refers to economic efficiency rather than technolog9. Id. § 301(a)(7), 16U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(7).
10. In passing, it might be noted that it would be desirable to broaden the interpretation of this objective to include the costs incurred by the fishermen in abiding
by the management measures; that is, some measures may require the fishermen to

incur greater direct or indirect costs than others. For example, a prohibition against
a technological innovation is likely to lead to higher costs in the catching of fish than
other measures that would permit innovation.
11. FCMA § 3(2)(B)(iii), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1977).
12. Id. § 301(a)(4)(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(4)(c). See also id. § 2(b)(6), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(6) (encouraging development of underutilized species); id. §
3(2)(B)(i), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(2)(B)(i) (encouraging plans that assure a supply of
food and recreational benefits).
13. It is a stated policy of Congress "to assure that the national fishery conservation and management program utilizes, and is based upon, the best scientific information available; involves, and is responsive to the needs of interested and affected
States and citizens; promotes efficiency; draws upon Federal, State, and academic
capabilities . . . and is workable and effective . . ." Id. § 2(c)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1801(c)(3). More specifically, one of the stated national standards is that "[c]onservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in
the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have economic
allocation as its sole purpose." Id. § 301(a)(5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(5).
14. 41 Fed. Reg. 39,436, 39,443 (1976).

659

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 657, 1977

ical efficiency. But although economic efficiency is a relatively clearcut guide for decisionmaking, the use of the phrase "where practicable" and the interpretation of the objective presented by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the regulations
significantly undermine its value. The regulations state:
Economic efficiency should be regarded as a subset of a larger framework for fishery management choices involving other decisions about
the distribution of costs and benefits, provision of employment opportunities, changes in the rate and composition of regional economic
development, environmental effects, etc. To follow efficiency principles exclusively may not provide the greatest overall benefits to the
nation or necessarily reduce costs to the consumer. Accordingly, both
the advantages and disadvantages of "efficiency" will have to be carefully weighted in the context of the objectives for the particular fishery
involved. 15
(One might ask, "What objectives?") Although the points raised by
NOAA are not necessarily invalid, they do not assist the decisionmaker, who must weigh and select from among objectives and courses
of action.
It should be noted that there are several other possible goals for
fisheries management that are either not mentioned or only implied in
the Act. For example, it is surprising that the goal of maintaining
employment opportunities for fishermen, an objective that has often
dominated decisions in the past,1 6 is absent from the Act.
The goals of consumers and taxpayers are mentioned only indirectly in the Act. For example, although it is a stated objective that
fisheries should be managed to assure a supply of food, 17 it is not
stated that the quality should be high, that prices should be low, and
that supplies should be secure. The Committee of Conference explained the Act's national standards:
15. Id. at 39,443.
16. Anthony D. Scott has stated:
To limit the freedom of fishermen to adopt the catching methods they prefer
is probably at once the oldest objective and method of regulation . . . . It must
be admitted that some types of gear have tremendous technical efficiency, so that
the sponsors of gear regulation have convinced themselves that their objective
has been to save the fish; whereas, since the alternative was to drop the number
of fishermen to a level compatible with the new efficiency, their implicit motive
was to save themselves from the competitive struggle.
Scott, The Economics of Regulating Fisheries, in EcONoMic EFFECTS OF FISHERY
REGULATION (R. Hamlisch ed. 1962) (U.N. Food & Agricultural Organization).
17. FCMA § 3(2)(B)(i), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1977).
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These standards, or basic objectives for a viable conservation and
management program for the Nation's fishery resources, are designed
to assure that management plans and regulations take into account the
variability of fish resources, the individuality of fishermen, the needs
of consumers, and the obligations to the general public, now and in
generations to come.18
However, there is no reference whatsoever to consumers in the national standards section of the Act 19 and nothing with regard to obligations to the general public, except the standard of minimizing the
costs of management measures.
In short, there is a significant inadequacy in the Act's stated management objectives. 20 In the preparation of management plans, the
Regional Councils will be left to their own devices, resolving policy
issues on an ad hoc basis in the context of the objectives for the particular fishery involved. As the individual Councils prepare their management plans, they may turn to the Secretary of Commerce, who is
required to "establish guidelines, based on the national standards, to
assist in the development of fishery management plans." 2 ' But, as suggested above, the standards provide little basis for the preparation of
guidelines, and if NOAA's contribution as evidenced by the interim
regulations is any indication, the Secretary may pass the buck back
to the Councils. Eventually the courts may be called upon to set
management objectives-a not unfamiliar phenomenon these days.
FISHERY INTERESTS

II.

The process of determining management goals can be greatly aided
18.
19.

S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1976).
See FCMA § 301, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (WestStipp. 1977).

20. It must be admitted that there is considerable difficulty in providing clear-cut
goals for fisheries management. This is due to several factors-the various and often
competitive interests in a fishery, the treatment of fisheries as common property natural resources, the disparate uses of the resources, and their hitherto international
character. The common property condition has led to the employment of excessive
numbers of fishermen in most of our fisheries. In this situation, the objective of
maximizing employment opportunities is directly in conflict with the objective of
maxinizing net economic revenues, because-in order to achieve the latter--some of
the fishermen will have to be displaced from the industry. Thus, it is not popular for
legislators to choose either of these goals in absolute terms. However, goals could

be stated in terms of improving net economic benefits, subject to certain constraints
such as the avoidance of undue hardship to present fishermen, the protection of employment opportunities for subsistence fishermen, and the prevention of the extinction
of species.
21.

FCMA § 301(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(b) (WestSupp. 1977).
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by the identification and definition of the many and varied interests in
fishery resources 22 and by an examination of how these interests are
likely to be affected by different policy alternatives.
As stated above, 23 one of the more potent political influences is the
protection of employment opportunities for the fisherman. From a
fisherman's perspective, however, this interest contains a number of
varied elements, some of which may conflict with one another. First,
the interests of full-time fishermen may differ from those of part-time
fishermen and also from those of potential fishermen wishing to preserve the opportunity to fish at some future time. This interest may
also be variably affected by whether the fishermen are boatowners and
by the size of their investments in their boats. Second, the question
arises whether the interest is in maintaining employment opportunities
at the same level of earnings or at an increased level. Third, there is
the question whether the employment is satisfactory on any terms or
only with regard to certain attributes such as freedom, independence,
risk taking, and natural surroundings. Finally, there is the question
whether the fishermen are subsistence or other fishermen without alternative opportunities for employment or are commercial fishermen
in large cities. Each of these elements may be affected in significantly
different ways by a policy decision.
A second set of interests are those of the fish processors. This group
generally seeks maximum access to low cost materials from any
source, domestic or foreign, and may wish to limit fishermen's access
to foreign processors. 24 But their views on different policies are likely
22. The identification of the interests that can have an influence on, or be
affected by, decisions is not a simple task with regard to fishery resources. The nature
of these resources and their use is such that noneconomic motivations are particularly important and may lead to actions that contradict expectations. Some fishermen, for example. may feel that they receive greater benefits from freedom from
regulations than they might from regulations that would increase their earnings.
Where such motivations exist, social-psychological studies are of critical importance
if administrators are to make effective decisions. Such studies will be helpful in
knowing (a) what measures are likely to be opposed to an extent that will lead to
excessive enforcement costs. and (b) how measures and plans may be presented to
achieve the greatest cooperation.
23. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
24. A move to prevent United States fishermen from selling their catch to
foreign processing ships may already be underway:
Korea Marine Development Corp.. for example, recently asked Oral Burch. a
shipowner in Alaska, to sign up 30 shrimp boats for catching pollock and delivering the raw fish to a Korean "factory ship" in the 200-mile conservation
zone . . . . But New England Fish Co. claims the Korean plan would "circum-

vent" the 200-mile law, invite the very overfishing that the conservation zone is
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to be affected by other considerations as well, such as the degree to
which they own or control fishing vessels, the amount and kind of fish
they export, and the kind of access they may have to foreign supplies.
A variety of other private interests can be identified. Recreational
fishing interests are clearly important, but also immensely varied,
ranging from "chicken-neckers" fishing from bridges and piers to deep
sea fishermen seeking trophies. Owners of party and charter boats and
manufacturers of sports craft and equipment are other important interests. Consumers wish a wide range of high quality products at low
prices, whether from foreign or domestic sources. Their interests,
however, may be colored by other factors such as nationalism (giving
preference to domestically caught products) and environmentalism
(boycotting offenders of environmental policy). Taxpayers wish to be
assured that satisfactory benefits are received from the use of public
funds. In some situations native Americans have special interests or
rights that can seriously affect policy decisions. 2 5 Fishery administrators, fishery scientists, boatbuilders, fishing gear manufacturers, maritime shipping firms, oil producers, municipalities wishing to dispose of
wastes at sea, and land developers in estuaries also have identifiable
interests that may be affected to a greater or lesser degree by policies
adopted for the management of fisheries.
Finally, various general societal interests can also be depicted. Because fishery resources are public property, society may wish to receive some direct benefits from those who use the public resources. If
use rights become exclusive through limited entry systems, then society may wish to receive some rents from the users similar to the
rents paid by oil companies for exclusive rights to the Outer Continental Shelf. Society may also be opposed to "windfall" gains that
might accrue to fishermen under various kinds of management systems. There may also be a general interest in ensuring that fisheries
management provides for the efficient allocation of capital and labor.
Finally, certain interests may value their perception of the fisherman's
"way of life."

supposed to prevent, stunt development of the U.S. industry on shore and imperil the company's long-standing plan to expand its processing plant on Kodiak
Island in Alaska.
Wall Street J., Apr. 20, 1977, at 4, col. 2 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing
Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REv. 61 (1975).
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Where the effects of policy decisions are specific and substantial,
one may expect an affected interest group to express its views fully
and forcibly. In some cases, however, the effects may be persuasive,
but not so large for any individual as to motivate or provoke action by
an individual within the group. This will generally be true for consumers, taxpayers, and other societal interests. It should be noted in this
regard that the Act serves special interests much better than general
ones. The fishing industry dominates the nongovermental membership
on the Regional Councils; 2 6 and, although there are provisions for
27
public hearings, these are mandatory only at the regional level,
thereby limiting the expression of overall national interests.
III.

POLICY ISSUES

The Regional Councils and the Secretary of Commerce face a large
number of difficult issues requiring decisions. Three of these issues are
discussed below in terms of their likely effect on different fishery interests. The first issue discussed is that of the adoption of limited entry
systems. This includes a discussion of user fees and taxes, not only
because it is an important form of limiting entry, but also because of
its significance for general societal interests. The second issue, also
related to the imposition of user fees or taxes, concerns the determination of the appropriate level and kind of public investment in fisheries
management and development. The third issue deals with the difficulties of allocating yields between recreational and commercial fishermen.
A.

Limited Entry Systems

Initially it is necessary to point out that if limited entry systems are
not adopted, there is no chance of achieving economic efficiency in
the fish catching part of the industry. As has been amply demonstrated, under the conditions of common property, total costs tend to

26. See Pontecorvo. supra note 7.
27. See Comment. Judicial Review of Fishery Management Regulations Under
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 599. 614
(1977).
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rise to meet total revenues, the fishery attracts excessive amounts of
capital and labor, and economic returns tend to become depressed.28
Maintaining this condition by refusing to adopt limited entry systems would produce losses of several kinds. First, there would be a
misallocation of capital and labor that could be used for other more
productive forms of enterprise. Second, economic rents would continue to be dissipated. Third, the costs of research, development,
management, and enforcement would continue to be borne fully by
the taxpayer. 29 Fourth, the fishermen would tend to suffer depressed
incomes, because entry would continue to be easier than exit from the
fishery and fishermen attracted to enter in good years would remain to
depress the incomes for all in bad years. Finally, in order to preserve
the resource under open access, it would be necessary to adopt increasingly stringent controls over the fishermen. Although these last
two effects might be postponed by the Act's provisions allowing for
the displacement of foreign fishermen, 30 they would be inevitable in
the long run. 3 1
On the positive side, benefits from the failure to adopt limited entry
systems would occur primarily in the form of enlarged employment
opportunities, although at low income levels. These benefits would not
accrue to those presently fishing but to newcomers. 32
If limited entry systems are adopted, the distributive effects on various interests will depend upon the characteristics of the system
adopted and the way in which it is implemented. There are essentially
three kinds of systems-the use of taxes or license fees as a disincentive, a limit on the number of inputs, and the creation of a form of
28.
(1965);

See F. CHRISTY & A. SCoT-r, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES
U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION,

THE ECONOMICS OF FISHERIES

(R. Turvey & J. Wisemen eds. 1957); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Scott, The Fishery:
The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955); Turvey, Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 64 (1964).
29. As noted in Part III-A-1 infra, license fees or taxes, imposed at a sufficiently

high rate to cover a large share of these costs, would constitute a form of limited
entry.

30. FCMA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d) (West Supp. 1977).
31. It should be pointed out that in some fisheries the costs and difficulties of
establishing and enforcing a limited entry system may be greater than the benefits that

could be obtained. Where this is the case, there is no rationale for public investment
in management of the fishery except possibly as a public welfare measure.
32. There may also be some benefits to society in maintaining the tradition of free
and open access and the resultant independent, individualistic, risk-taking way of life
(or what is perceived to be such). It is quite likely that a limited entry system, if
effective, will attract "big business" and destroy these attributes.
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property rights in the resource through a technique such as fisherman
quotas. 3 3 The effectiveness of the different systems will depend upon
the characteristics of the fishery; but, as will be seen, a combination of
systems probably would be desirable in most cases.
Limited entry based upon taxes andfees

1.

The first system-that of user fees or taxes-limits entry by increasing the costs of fishing, thereby removing those fishermen who
are unwilling or unable to pay the fees. Under the FCMA, it appears
that Congress has established a policy regarding the imposition of user
fees or taxes on domestic fishermen. The Act provides for the use of
permits, but limits fees for permits to the administrative costs incurred
in issuing them. 3 4 It is clear, however, that this policy should be reeval33.

See Christy. Alternative Entry Controls for Fisheries, in LIMITED ENTRY INTO
Mundt ed., Institute for Marine Studies.
FISHERIES 86 (J. C.

THE COMMERCIAL

University of Washington 1974).
34. The Act states that "the Secretary shall by regulation establish the level of
any fees which are authorized to be charged pursuant to section 303(b)(1). Such
level shall not exceed the administrative costs incurred by the Secretary in issuing
such permits." FCMA § 304(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(d) (West Supp. 1977). Section
303(b)(1) is a discretionary provision, permitting the requirement of a permit
"with respect to any fishing vessel of the United States fishing, or wishing to fish, in the
fishery conservation zone .... ' 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
Although these provisions might be interpreted as not prohibiting the imposition
of taxes or fees for special kinds of permits, this view is not shared by the author.
It should be noted that the bill passed by the Senate stated that fees. if imposed.
should be "appropriate to the value of the fishing license or permit." S. 961. 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(b)(5) (1975). One can infer a similar view in the House
version from the provision that the amount of fees can "vary . . . between different
categories of domestic fishermen." H.R. 200. 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. § 304(b)(3)(E)
(1975). Because both of these versions were struck by the Committee of Conference.
the logical inference is that Congress decided to restrict the level of fees to that
of the costs incurred in issuing the permits. Elsewhere in this symposium. Professor
William T. Burke argues that this is not a correct interpretation of the Act and that
the recovery of economic rent from the fishery is possible. See Burke. Recapture of
Economic Rent Under the FCMA: Sections 303-304 on Permits and Fees, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 681 (1977).

If this interpretation is correct, it would appear from an internal regulation that
the Department of Commerce will be required to submit a legislative proposal for
the establishment of "user charges," if limited entry systems are adopted. Bureau of
the Budget Circular No. A-25, Sept. 23, 1959, states that "[i]n cases where collection of fees and charges for services or property . . . is limited or restricted by provisions of existing law, the agencies concerned will submit appropriate remedial
legislative proposals to the Bureau of the Budget .... ." The services and property
referred to include "all Federal activities which convey special benefits to recipients
above and beyond those accruing to the public at large." such as certain water resource projects, crop insurance, or licenses to carry on a specific business. It would
seem clear that a limited entry system conveys a special benefit to fishermen above
and beyond those accruing to the public at large. (I am indebted to Fred L. Olson.
National Marine Fisheries Service, for bringing this to my attention.)
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uated. 35 If a limited entry system is not adopted and taxes or fees
36
are negligible, conditions will remain economically poor.
Under present conditions the imposition of fees or taxes alone
would constitute a hardship for fishermen; but this hardship might
prove to be transitional. If the fees or taxes were large enough, they
would serve as an entry limit because some of the fishermen would be
deterred from remaining in the fishery. The total allowable catch
would then be shared by fewer fishermen, and each would receive a
greater catch.3 7 Thus, the chief beneficiaries of a no-fee, no-limitedentry system are likely to be the casual and potential fishermen rather
than the full-time fishermen.
With either of the other two kinds of limited entry systems-a limit
on inputs or the establishment of individual fishermen quotas-the
privilege to fish would acquire value. 38 In the absence of significant
taxes or fees, the value would accrue entirely to the privileged fishermen. If the privilege is nontransferable, the value would be reflected
in higher earnings as prices increase and as some of the license holders
or vessels retire from the fishery. If the privilege is transferable, the
value would appear in the sale price of the privilege. The benefits thus
would go to those fishermen able to obtain licenses at the initial allocation. 39 The amount of the rents would depend upon the effective35.

Christy, Limited Access Systems Under the Fishery Conservation and Man-

agemnent Act of 1976, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTIONS

141 (L. Anderson ed. 1977). See also Anderson & Wilson, Economic Dimensions of
Fees and Access Controls Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701 (1977).
36. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.

37. In Ohio full-time fishermen found it desirable to go along with an increase in
a gear fee from $8 to $800 beause it effectively removed a large number of casual
fishermen. See LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 33, at
23-24 (statement of Russell Scholl), 38-42 (statement of Ray Full).

38. The author has previously made a rough estimate that for United States
fisheries as a whole the value of the privilege to fish may be as high as $5 billion.
Christy, supra note 35, at 146. This is based on the assumption that under the present

condition of free and open access the same total catch and same gross revenue might
be achieved with one third less capital and labor than currently is being used. If it is
assumed that total costs are roughly equal to total revenues, there would be an un-

usual waste on the order of $300 million. At six percent, the capitalized value of
this waste would equal $5 billion. Although this is a speculative figure and it is unlikely that such high economic rents could be produced under the best of systems,
it does provide a rough indication of the significance of the value of the privilege to
fish.
39. In British Columbia, where there is a limit on the total tonnage of vessels
fishing for salmon, the open market price for a license has been as high as $6000 per
vessel ton. See LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 33, at
29-30 (statement of Maury P. Houghton). In Alaska, within less than a year of the
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ness of the limited entry system and the prices for the products. Potential and casual fishermen unable to acquire licenses would not receive
benefits because they would be required to buy out license holders if
40
they wished to fish.
If the Act permitted the imposition of taxes or fees, society could
share in these "windfall" gains. The choice of the amount of the share
-the level of the tax-could be made on the basis of various different interests, the two most important being the taxpayer and society
as the "owner" of the resources. As to the taxpayer, the administration
of the Act will require the use of fairly sizeable public funds for research, regulation, and enforcement and may lead to demands for the
use of public funds for development. If only a small share of the available economic rents is captured by society in the form of taxes or fees,
then the taxpayer will be the chief loser. However, the fishermen may
also suffer over the long run, because there will be little justification
41
for the use of public funds to support the industry.
A separate issue is raised with regard to the resource "owners."
Fishery resources are part of the public domain, similar to wildlife
stocks, public grazing lands, timber lands, oil on the Outer Continental Shelf, and national parks. In some of these cases, exclusive use
rights are made available to those who are willing to pay rents to the
resource "owner"-society. For example, in the case of Outer Continental Shelf oil, the rents are expressed in terms of bonus payments
and royalties. The bidding mechanism results in rents paid that
roughly reflect the value of the exclusive right of access. They are extremely high simply because the value of the oil is so high.
If open access for commercial fisheries is continued, allowing
anyone to enter a fishery, it would be inappropriate to charge rents for
the use of the resource (although fees to help cover the costs of management, research, and development might still be desirable). However, if entry into the fishery is limited through controls on inputs or
fisherman quotas, then a form of exclusive right accrues to a class of
users. In this situation, a decision not to require payments for the priv-

establishment of the salmon limited entry program, prices have risen to more than
$10,000 per license. See [1975] ALAS. COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMM'N ANN.
REP. 3.

40. This should not be particularly distressing, however, because it would not be
much different from potential farmers having to buy or lease land in order to farm.
41. See Part III-B infra.
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ileges would constitute a loss to the resource owner (society) and a
transfer of income to the privileged fishermen.
Although it is not necessarily harmful to society that such a transfer
of income take place-we have lived with grosser kinds of inequities
in the allocation of natural resources 4 2 -the extraction of economic
rents from the fishermen enjoying a limited entry privilege can be
achieved without causing hardship. If, for example, the Senate version
of the Act had been allowed to stand, the taxes or fees would have
been "appropriate to the value of the fishing license or permit"; 43 that
is, the fishermen would not have been asked to pay anything more
than the extra returns that they would have been receiving from the
limited entry system. Their only loss would have been a potential
"windfall" gain.
In sum, the use of taxes or fees as the sole means for limiting entry
would produce severe (though transitional) hardships on present fishermen. If other limited entry techniques are adopted without imposing
taxes or fees, they may produce significant initial benefits to the fishermen acquiring fishing privileges under the system. Losses will be
borne by the casual and potential fishermen who are not able to acquire fishing privileges, because both groups will have to pay for
something they presently can receive for free. Members of society will
also suffer losses, both as taxpayers and as the "owners" of the resources. In the long run, it is quite likely that the fishermen will also
suffer because of the difficulty of justifying the use of public funds to
support services for such an industry.
If taxes or license fees appropriate to the value of the fishing privileges are imposed, then society will achieve some gains. The full-time
fishermen will be no worse off than at present (perhaps better off because full rents may not be extracted and support for services will be
easier to achieve). Casual and potential fishermen, under limited entry
systems, would be adversely affected whether or not taxes are imposed.
The likely effect of taxes or fees on consumer interests is not clear.
If the taxes simply remove the extra return resulting from limited en42.

The Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, and the Taylor Grazing Act

of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.), are
examples of federal statutes giving public resources to special interests at little or

no cost to those interests.
43. See note 34 supra.
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try, there is no reason to believe that prices would increase. Prices
would be more significantly affected by changes in the structure of the
industry, bargaining power of fishermen, and other factors, the net
effect of which cannot be anticipated.
2.

Limited entry based upon restrictionson inputs

The second technique-that of placing a limit on the number of
inputs-is the one generally considered in discussions on limited
entry. This system imposes a limit on one or more inputs into the fishery, such as the number of fishermen, vessels, tons of vessels, and pots.
In order to avoid transitional hardship, this system presumably would
provide licenses to all fishermen with a bona fide claim to having been
participants in the fishery. The licenses obtained for the inputs would
probably have to be transferable in order to meet constitutional requirements. 44 Thus, in order to reduce the number of inputs in a
44. Knight and Lambert, in a study of several cases involving limited entry in
fisheries, point out that nontransferability is often a cause for judicial concern:
The provision [for entry permits] must not create a closed class nor may the
classification system be arbitrary. The equal protection clause demands that the
class be reasonably constituted and relatively accessible to new entrants. The use
of freely transferable entry permits appears to be a significant factor in "opening"
otherwise closed classes.
H.G. Knight & J. Lambert, Legal Aspects of Limited Entry for Commercial Marine
Fisheries 117 (Oct. 15. 1975) (prepared for the National Marine Fisheries Service).
Furthermore, transferability was deliberately included in the Alaskan law on limited
entry in salmon fisheries in order to meet state (if not federal) constitutional requirements. According to the acting chairman of the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry
Commission.
[t] he issue of transferability of the permanent entry permits was the biggest
stumbling block in getting the legislation enacted .... Our legal advisors told us
that the element of free transferability was essential if the permits were to be
transferable at all.
The problem was one of not creating a closed class of fishermen to which there
was no means of entry. Free transferability is a means of allowing that class to
stay open so that anyone who wants to go fishing can buy a permit from someone
else and enter the fishery. . . .We couldn't create a closed class and expect the
Act to survive a constitutional challenge in the courts.
LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 33, at 9 (statement of
Roy A. Rickey). It should be noted that Ohio adopted legislation that severely circumscribes transferability of permits. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.342 (Page Supp.
1976). Under this Act annual licenses are issued only to those fishermen who had a
license in the previous year, unless it has been decided that additional licenses are
made available. In such case the applicants must satisfy the following qualifications:
"[N] inety days Ohio residency immediately preceding application; two years commercial fishing gear experience, or holder of an Ohio commercial license of another
gear; posting of a one thousand dollar performance bond or cash deposit in a like
amount." Id.

According to Knight and Lambert, however, this system is unconstitutional on two
grounds: First, "[i] t is clear that limited entry systems which are designed to or have
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fishery that is already overcapitalized, the superfluous fishermen or
vessels would have to be bought out.
Politically this may be the easiest system to adopt because of its
familiarity and because, by "grandfathering," transitional hardships
may be minimized. However, the long run effects (the long run may
be only a few years) are likely to be quite damaging to most interests,
including those of the fishermen, due to the ease with which one input
may be substituted for another in most fisheries. 45 The fishermen will
always have a profit incentive for substitution, thus leading to further
investments and a continued dissipation of net economic revenues as
total costs rise to reach total revenues.
Administrators can respond in only one of two ways-by prohibiting the substitutions or by buying out more licenses as the substitutions take place. Unless funds for buying out the superfluous inputs
are available, the first technique will be followed. Eventually this will
the effect of restricting entry on the basis of state citizenship are unconstitutional
because of the equal protection and interstate commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution," Knight & Lambert, supra, at 74; and second,
[t]
his system of subsequent entry envisions- apprentices qualifying for available
permits through work on vessels owned or operated by permit holders. The obvious
legal defect is that it perpetuates a closed class because the permit holders
are the ultimate arbiters of who may or may not become an apprentice. This sort
of arrangement would likely not survive an equal protection challenge.
Id. at 82.
[Editor's Note: If the above argument is meant to suggest that a fishery management authority cannot limit the alienability of permits or licenses, its accuracy is
highly questionable. So long as the allocation of licenses is nondiscriminatory and in
conformance with equal protection criteria, restrictions on alientation, such as those
designed to prevent the license holder from capitalizing on the value of his privilege
through sale, should be constitutionally valid. There should be no due process obstacle to such restrictions, so long as they are based on a legitimate objective and
the means chosen are reasonable. Cf., e.g., Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D.
Md.), affd per curian 355 U.S. 37 (1957) (gear restriction on purse nets valid
even though it eliminated the commercial menhaden fishery). See also Note, Legal
Dimensions of Entry Fishery Management, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 757 (1976).
Nontransferable licenses are presently used in several fishery management schemes.
For example, California's statute for the management of herring provides as follows:
Herring may be taken for commercial purposes only under a revocable, nontransferable permit . .

.

.The commission may, whenever necessary to prevent

overutilization [or] to insure efficient and economic operation of the fishery...
limit the total number of permits which are granted and the amount which may
be taken under such permits.
CAL. FIsH & GAME CODE § 8550 (West Supp. 1977).]

45. For example, in the British Columbia experience, an initial limit was placed
on the number of vessels. This promptly induced fishermen to trade in their small
vessels for much larger ones. In response, the administrators then limited the total
tonnage of the salmon fleet. The fishermen, in turn, then shifted from gill nets to
purse seines and drum seines. See LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES,

supra note 33, at 27, 30 (statement of Maury P. Houghton).
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lead to a highly circumscribed fishery in which all inputs are dictated
by the administrators. A system of rigidly fixed inputs will likely result
in consumers paying higher prices than under systems that would
permit orderly technological innovations. Increased prices due to
rising demand will produce economic rents which will be captured by
the fishermen rather than by society unless taxes and fees are adjusted.
A modification of this system would permit the administrators to
buy out the superfluous effort. As the individual units of effort increase their efficiency by innovation or substitution, the total number
of units could be decreased if the administering agency were able to
purchase some of them and retire them from the fishery. This could
reduce the total costs of fishing units and produce surplus net economic
revenues. This modification would permit increased economic efficiency and better allocation of capital and labor; but, in the absence
of adequate taxes or fees, the fishermen would share the net economic
revenues among themselves, while society would bear the costs of
buying out the superfluous inputs-a direct transfer of income from
the taxpayers to the fishermen.
Finally, even if nontransferable permits were permissible, 46 there is
serious question whether they would be economically desirable. Theoretically, it might appear desirable to provide nontransferable licenses
to all present fishermen or fishing vessels and then let natural attrition
remove the superfluous effort. But as vessels sink or fishermen retire
or die, the remaining license holders would begin to acquire surplus
returns, or what might be called "survivor rents." The older they become, the more incentive they would have to continue fishing. Eventually, the fishery would be marked by "ancient mariners" or by superannuated (and probably unsafe) vessels.
Furthermore, when the appropriate amount of fishing effort has
been removed, the problem of allowing for new entrants to maintain
the appropriate level emerges. If transferability is prohibited at this
point, there would be no market mechanism for allocating fishing
privileges and permitting efficient producers to flow into the fishery.
Instead, new entrants would have to be selected by lottery, on a firstcome-first-served basis or according to arbitrary criteria such as need
or experience. These consequences might be avoided by providing the
management agency with the right to buy and sell fishing privileges,
46.
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but it can be argued that this would constitute a form of transferability.
3.

Limited entry based uponfisherman quotas

The third system-fisherman quotas4 7-- provides a form of property right in the resource by allocating to the fisherman a share of the
total allowable catch. The allocation, expressed as a percentage of
annual yield, might be based on the past record of catch. Fishermen
would be free to lease or sell their quotas and free to take their shares
in any way they wished, provided their techniques were not destructive of the resource. The rationale for proposing such a system is that
it would permit an orderly rate of technological innovation to take
place. The chief disadvantage would be the difficulty of determining
the initial allocation of quotas, particularly if it were necessary to decrease the total allowable catch in order to improve future yields.
Fishermen acquiring quota rights would benefit from an absence of
stringent regulations; 48 and, if taxes or fees are not imposed, they
would also benefit from the potential of acquiring "windfall" gains
when they sell or lease their quotas. However, if adequate taxes or fees
are not levied, society would incur the same losses as those for other
limited entry systems, although consumers would probably benefit
from improved technological efficiency through lower prices. (However, it may be necessary to place a limit on the amount of quotas that
any one fisherman could own in order to prevent a monopoly.)
In sum, the choice to reject limited entry systems produces few
benefits for any of the various interests involved, satisfying only potential fishermen who desire free access to the resources and those elements of society that enjoy the preservation of anachronisms. The net
effect of adopting limited entry depends in part upon the system that
is used and in part upon whether adequate taxes or fees can and will
be imposed.

47. See F. Christy, Fisherman Quotas: A Tentative Suggestion for Domestic
Management (1973) (Occasional Paper No. 19, Law of the Sea Institute, University
of Rhode Island).
48. They might, however, incur psychological loss in that they could no longer

take pride in being known as "high liners," the fishermen who make greater catches
than their colleagues.
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Investment of Public Funds

The objective of promoting commercial and recreational fishing
may be accomplished in numerous ways, including the enhancement
of the resource, the removal of institutional impediments to efficient
use, the adoption and implementation of effective management measures, and the provision of direct or indirect subsidies. The first two
approaches are facilitated by the Act4 9 and, except for mariculture,
generally do not require significant investment of public funds. The
other two approaches do. The three major functions of management
-research; formulation, adoption and implementation of regulations;
and enforcement-are appropriately the function of public agencies;
and subsidy, by definition, involves direct or indirect use of public
funds. Ensuring that the public's funds are used to the best advantage
involves an examination of how the various affected interests are benefited or damaged by programs designed to promote fishing.
In the following discussion, it is assumed that benefits of management and subsidy accrue to the fishermen, even though it is recognized
that various elements of the fishermen's interest are affected in different ways by different programs. The discussion focuses on the benefits and losses from certain kinds of programs that are likely to affect
the interests of various segments of society-the consumer, the taxpayer, and society itself as the "owner" of the resource. 50 Although a
variety of questions can be raised, three are particularly important: Is
the program desirable for the particular interest? If so, does the program justify the use of public, rather than private, funds? If public
funds are appropriate, will the benefits to society be greater than from
other uses of the scarce funds?
49. Enhancement of the resource has been accomplished to a large extent by
the extension of jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. This provides the United States
the opportunity to develop fisheries that are currently underutilized or not utilized
by domestic fishermen. See FCMA § 2(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (b)(6) (West
Supp. 1977). Mariculture is another means of enhancing the resource, although limited to a few highly valued species and requiring public investment.
The removal of institutional impediments is also facilitated by the 200-mile limit.
In particular, it has become much easier to deal with the problem of common property
and adopt limited entry systems that can improve the efficiency in the allocation of
capital and labor.
50. Society, as the "owner" of the resource, has a number of interests in a fishery's
use. That of acquiring some rents from the users has already been discussed. See
Part II supra. It also has an interest in preserving a multiplicity of options and in
ensuring that the resource is not abused. FCMA § 3(2)(B)(iii), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802
(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp 1977).
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In most cases where natural resources are privately owned, a large
portion of the management activities are undertaken by the owner. 51
But where resources are publicly owned, particularly where they are
treated as common property, several of these functions must be fulfilled by public agencies. This is not only because society has the right
to prevent abuse of its resources, but also because external forces prevent private operators from supplying management services. For example, there is no incentive for an individual fisherman or fishing
company to invest in research or enforcement, because the benefits
will be available to all fishermen for free and the investor will be unable to recover costs. Nor is there incentive for a person to voluntarily
restrain his catch in the interest of future returns, because anything
that he leaves in the sea for tomorrow will be taken by others today.
Management costs, however, are part of the cost of doing business,
and they should properly be included in any calculations concerning
the contribution of fisheries to the economy. In such calculations, one
must deduct from gross revenues not only the costs of the fishing operations, but also many of the costs of research, administration, and
enforcement.
Although it is fully appropriate for public agencies to fulfill most of
these functions of management, it is not at all clear that the costs of
doing so should be borne entirely by the public. For example, in those
situations where it is desirable to buy out superfluous licenses, society
receives some general benefits in increased efficiency, but the fishermen receive specific and direct benefits from the sale of their privilege or from decreased competition. It would not be unreasonable for
society to demand that the fishing industry bear these kinds of costs or
at least contribute commensurate funds through taxes or fees to the
public treasury.
A fundamental issue underlying the use of public funds is how
much society is willing to pay to protect the resource. If a species is
likely to be extinguished under conditions of nonmanagement, then
the taxpayer may be willing to bear fairly high costs to ensure that this
does not happen. But if extinction or irreversible modification of the

51. For example, many lumber companies with large timberlands undertake their
own research, administer their lands, regulate their operations to achieve long-term
yields, and invest in disease and predation control. These activities are internal to the
firm and are considered an ordinary part of doing business.
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environment is not a likely possibility, then the taxpayer's willingness
to pay high management costs may be greatly diminished.
For example, the prevention of a depletion of a particular stock
may require a high public investment in research, regulation, and enforcement. If the benefits from preventing depletion (for instance, the
contributions to the economy of the added yield and the preservation
of employment opportunities) are less than the costs, then it may be
preferable to adopt the concept of "pulse" fishing. A management
program based on this concept would allow the stock to be fished
down to the point where economic returns are unsatisfactory, then
would close the fishery and require fishermen to catch other stocks
until the original one replenishes itself. Of course, numerous factors
would have to be taken into consideration before deciding to implement such a program; the point remains, however, that simply because a stock exists and is of some interest to fishermen, the prevention of depletion does not justify the expenditure of public funds
greater than the sum of the benefits that can be achieved.
The consumers' interest in a stable supply of low-priced, highquality products can be affected by a wide range of governmental
management activities. Where commercial fishing is promoted by
management activities that improve efficiency and competition, the
interest of consumers will generally be satisfied. But if the goal of
promoting the industry is approached by activities designed to protect
fishermen from competition, such as tariffs on imported fish products,
then consumers may incur losses through higher prices. Decreasing
foreign access to domestic stocks that foreigners can catch, process,
and place in the United States market at lower prices than domestic
fishermen would also be damaging to the consumer. Such activities
cannot be justified unless it is clearly demonstrated that there are sufficient benefits to other national interests.
More complicated questions are raised when the promotional activity would clearly produce benefits to the consumer but at costs to
the taxpayer. An example is the possible use of public funds to develop an improved technology for the processing of bottom fish. Generally, processing technology should be left in the hands of private
entrepreneurs. There are, however, certain conditions that may warrant the investment of public funds. If, for example, private development would lead to monopsonistic conditions so that there were only
one buyer for the fishermen's catches, public investment might be jus-
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tified. Or the time between the initiation of research and the operation
of a technology may appear too long and too costly to attract private
investment. In such circumstances, if the long-term payoff to society is
high enough, public investment through incentives or subsidies might
be justified. However, as in all cases where the use of public funds is
being considered, it must be shown that the benefits from that use are
greater than those from other possible uses.
Other kinds of subsidies are likely to be sought by fishing interests.
In some regions fishermen may request support for the construction of
newer and larger vessels in order to increase capacity and thereby increase their ability to claim larger shares of the total allowable
catch. 52 There may also be demands for public investment in the
promotion of markets for presently underutilized species, for the development of improved gear, and for reimbursement of fees paid by
United States fishermen fishing in foreign zones.
All such subsidies carry costs for the economy, whether direct or
indirect. Although subsidies have become a way of life for certain
industries in the United States, this does not justify uncritical adoption
of subsidies for the fishing industry. Subsidies are not only costly to
the economy, but in some cases they also tend to perpetuate inefficiency and impede desirable developments. It is therefore necessary to
examine carefully the rationale for public support and the distribution
of benefits and costs before undertaking subsidized programs.
C.

Allocation of Yields Between Commercial and Recreational
Fishermen

The problems of allocating yields between commercial and recreational fishermen are more purely distributional in nature than those
discussed above. There are few, if any, other natural, resources where
conflict between different users is so direct. For example, in water resources, techniques are available for restoring quality after use so that
different users may enjoy the same water, provided they pay the costs
of cleaning it. But in fisheries a fish taken for one purpose becomes
52.

It may seem that there is a contradiction between demands to increase capac-

ity, on the one hand, and the desirability of buying out superfluous capacity, on
the other hand. To be sure, in some cases vessels may be sufficiently adaptable to
move easily from an overcrowded fishery into an uncrowded one. In other cases,
however, mobility may be severely limited so that overcapitalization may persist
even though other nearby stocks are underutilized.
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unavailable for another, and the issue is not one of distributing monetary costs but of distributing the resource directly.
There are three different techniques for dealing with the problems
of allocation between commercial and recreational fishermen-administrative, market, and legislative. The Act has chosen the first
course, but in future revisions it may be desirable to investigate the
other two. Under the administrative technique, decisions of allocation
are made by an agency (the Regional Councils or the Department of
Commerce under the FCMA) presumed capable of determining who
should get what share of the yield. But, in general, there are no satisfactory criteria for making such a determination in this case. Concepts
such as equity and need will be raised but cannot be satisfactorily
defined. The administrators may attempt to use measures such as contribution to the economy or amount of employment, but the choice of
the measure itself is likely to have a determining effect on the distribution and will thereby become a source of dispute. In addition, any
basis for distribution that may become acceptable in one Council
could be challenged in another.
Instead of pursuing a course that will be fraught with persistent
conflict, it may be desirable to explore the other techniques for
making allocation decisions. One of these would be to put the resources on a market basis, awarding access to the user paying the
highest price. This would greatly simplify the process of allocation
and considerably diminish the negotiating or transaction costs. However, as noted above, the decision itself would have a distributive effect, and all parties (both commercial and recreational) would be required to pay for something they now receive free. Eventually, as limited entry systems become more widely adopted and fishermen come
to accept the fact that fishing privileges have value, a market approach might be adopted.
The other approach would be to determine the allocation of yields
on the basis of votes within some kind of legislative framework.5 3 This
might initially be done through special referenda within states where
there are particularly difficult conflicts. Or it might be desirable to
have Council members elected rather than appointed, using special
districts for this purpose. Such a move, however, would require a
53.
MENT
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drastic revision of the Act, if not totally new legislation, and would
require careful study of all its ramifications.
As the Act now stands, the Regional Councils and the Secretary of
Commerce will be faced with difficult and painful decisions on the
distribution of yields between commercial and recreational fishermen.
They have no guidelines for the decisions, nor are they likely to develop guidelines that are satisfactory. Although there are only a few
fisheries at present where such decisions are necessary, these tend to
be highly valued and their number will increase in the future. In short,
the problems will become increasingly severe and will necessitate resolution by the courts or the adoption of new techniques for determining
who gets what.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976 may be considered simply the first stage in a major transition
from the era of free fishing to an era of national jurisdiction. In this
context, one should not expect the Act to resolve all of the difficult
problems of fisheries management. And indeed, it has not. It has provided dramatic new opportunities for effective management of fisheries, but it has failed to ensure that the opportunities will be taken.
In large part, this is due to the failure of the Act to set satisfactory
objectives for management. This means that there are few guidelines
for the complex decisions that will have to be made by the Regional
Councils and the Secretary of Commerce. The result is likely to be
inconsistency in the decisions made by the different Councils and
conflicts among the various interests affected by the decisions.
Eventually these conflicts may lead to improved definitions of management objectives, but the process may be long and costly. It could
involve actions by the courts and the Office of Management and
Budget that would seriously delay the adoption and implementation of
management plans and leave fisheries management in a state of confusion for several years.
In order to help reduce the severity of these consequences, early
efforts should be made to improve the statements of management
objectives. These efforts should be made by both the Department of
Commerce and the Congress. They should include careful definition
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of the many and varied interests affected by management decisions,
with particular regard to society's interests as "owner," the consumer's
interests, and the taxpayer's interests. They should examine the consequences of different decisions on these interests and, through this process, work out a set of management goals that will serve as useful
guides for decisions.
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